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LEWIS AND QUEEN (a Partnership) et al., Appellants, v.
N. M. BALL SONS (a Partnership) et al., Respondents.
[1] Licenses-Contractors.-A partnership which actually undertook to "construct a highway" for another partnership acted
as a contractor within the meaning of Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 7026.
[2] Contracts-Effect of Illegality.-Whatever the state of the
pleadings, when the evidence shows that plaintiff in substance
seeks to enforce an illegal contraet or to reeover compensation
for an illegal act, the court has both the power and duty to
aseertain the true facts in order that it may not unwittingly
lend its assistance to the consummation or encouragement of
what public policy forbids.
[3] !d.-Effect of IUegality.-It is immaterial that the parties,
whether by inadvertence or consent, do not raise the issue of
an illegal contract at the trial, since the court may do so on its
own motion when the testimony produces evidence of illegality; and it is not too late to raise the issue on motion for new
trial, in a proceeding to enforce an arbitration award, or even
on appeal.
[ 4] Evidence-Extrinsic Evidence-Invalidating Instrument.-The
parol evidence rule does not exclude evidence showing that a
contract lawful on its face is in fact part of an illegal
transaction. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1856.)
[5] Contracts-Effect of Illegality: Evidence-Extrinsic Evidence
-Invalidating Instrument.-The policy in favor of narrowing
the issues in dispute, which normally confines the court to
those made by the pleadings, and the policy of the parol
evidence rule favoring the conclusiveness of integrated written
instruments, both give way before the importance of discouraging illegal conduct, since to this end the trial court must
be free to search out illegality lying behind the forms in which
the parties have cast the transaction to conceal such illegality.
[6] Licenses-Contractors.-A partnership which acted as a contractor under Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7026, did not substantially
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Licenses, § 41; Am.Jur., Licenses, § 47 et seq.
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Contracts, §§ 98, 99; Am.Jur., Contracts,
§ 210.
[ 4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 272; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 1098.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 6-8] Licenses, § 21.1; [2, 3] Contracts,
§76; [4] Evidence, §384; [5] Contracts, §76; Evidence, §384;
[9-13, 15-21] Licenses, §58; [14] Contracts, § 79.
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comply with the requirement of § 7028, making it unlawful for
any person to act in the capacity of a contractor without
having a license therefor, because one partner held an individual license, since the "person" that did the contracting work,
namely, the partnership, had no license.
[7] Id.-Contractors.-Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7029, expressly requires individual licensees who eng·age jointly in the contracting business to obtain an additional, joint license.
[8] Id.-Contractors.-The fact that a licensed partner of a
contracting business supervised actual construction work did
not make it less necessary for the other partner to procure a
license, though his activities may have been confined to bookkeeping and the search for new business, since the statutory
provisions setting forth the qualifications for a license and
the causes for disciplinary action against licensees show that
the Legislature was as much concerned to protect the public
from dishonesty and incompetence in the administration of
the contraeting business as in the actual use of bricks, mortar
and earthmoving equipment (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 7068, 7069,
7120) and furthermore show that, if the contraetor is a partnership, the experience, knowledge and integrity of each
partner is a vital eonsideration in determining whether to issue
a license. (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 7067, 7069, 7071.)
[9] !d.-Nonpayment as Affecting Contracts.-A partnership which
entered into a subcontract to supply equipment, remove concrete and apply water on a parkway construction job, but
whieh did not comply with the licensing statute, cannot "bring
or maintain any action in any court of this State for the
collection of compensation." (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7031.)
[10] !d.-Nonpayment as Affecting Contracts.-Though the general contractor for whom an unlicensed partnership performed
work on a parkway construction job was paid in full by the
state, it was not required to turn over to the partnership the
proceeds from the state contract attributable to the partnership's labor, since, even in the absence of a prohibitory statute
such as Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7031, the courts generally
will not enforce an illegal bargain or lend their assistance to
a party who seeks compensation for an illegal act; the consideration that the contractor may be left in possession of some
benefit which it should in good conscience turn over to the
partnership is outweighed by the importance of deterring
illegal conduct.
[11] !d.-Nonpayment as Affecting Contracts.-Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 7031, represents a legislative determination that the importance of deterring unlicensed persons from engaging in
the contracting business outweighs any harshness between the
parties, and that such deterrence can best be realized by
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denying violators the right to maintain any action for compensation in the courts.
[12] !d.-Nonpayment as Affecting Contracts.-An action by an
unlicensed partnership against a contractor to enforce directly an illegal contract for work on a parkway construction
job, not merely to obtain an accounting for profits arising
from one, falls squarely within Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7031,
preeluding recovery for work done in the capacity of contractor by one who is not licensed.
[13] !d.-Nonpayment as Affecting Contracts.-The courts may not
resort to equitable considerations, such as unjust enrichment,
in defiance of Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7031, precluding recovery
for work done in the capacity of contractor by one who is
not licensed.
[14] Contracts-Effect of Illegality-Parties not in Pari Delicto.
-vVhen the Legislature enacts a statute forbidding certain
conduct for the purpose of protecting one class of persons
from the activities of another, a member of the protected class
may maintain an action notwithstanding the fact that he has
shared in the illegal transaction; the protective purpose of
the legislation is realized by allowing plaintiff to maintain his
action against a defendant within the class primarily to be
deterred, and in such situation plaintiff is not in paTi delicto.
[15] Licenses-Nonpayment as Affecting Contracts.-The class
protected by a licensing statute includes those who deal with
a person required by the statute to have a license, and subcontractors are not always in the class to be protected simply
because they are subcontractors.
[16] Id,...:_Nonpayment as Affecting Contracts.-When the person
required to have a license is a general contractor, the protected
class includes subcontractors, materialmen, employees and
owners dealing with the general contractor.
[17] !d.-Nonpayment as Affecting Contracts.-When the person
required to have a license but did not have one is a subcontractor, he is not to be protected from his own unlicensed
activities; to allow him to recover would destroy the protection
of those who dealt with him, and they are in the class the
Legislature intended to protect whether they are owners or
general contractors. (Disapproving Matchett v. Gould, 131 Cal.
App.2d 821, 281 P.2d 524.)
[18] !d.-Nonpayment as Affecting Contracts.-An unlicensed subcontractor may not maintain an action against a general contractor for work performed simply because the action is
against a licensed member of plaintiff's own profession, rather
than against the owner for whose benefit the work was done;
general contractors as much as owners are entitled to raise
the defense of lack of license in the subcontractor.
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[19a, 19b] !d.-Nonpayment as Affecting Contracts.-A subcontractor who did not have a contractor's license at the time
work was performed under a subcontract may not maintain
an action against sureties on labor and material bonds posted
by a licensed general contractor in compliance with Gov.
Code, § 4200, and on stop notice bonds posted by such contractor pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 1184e (now § 1192.1),
since the subcontractor's object is to obtain by indirect means
compensation for unlicensed work.
[20] !d.-Nonpayment as Affecting Contracts.-Actions to enforce
an arbitration award and to foreclose a mechanic's lien are
within the meaning of Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7031, precluding
recovery for work done in the capacity of contractor by one
who is not licensed.
[21] !d.-Nonpayment as Affecting Contracts.-In an action by an
unlicensed subcontractor against sureties on labor and material
bonds posted by a licensed general contractor in compliance
with Gov. Code, § 4200, and on stop notice bonds posted by
such contractor pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 1184e (now
§ 1192.1), the defense of illegality is available to a surety
if it is available to his principal; the obligation of the sureties
on such bonds was not to pay for labor merely by virtue of
the fact that it had been expended on a construction job, but
was an obligation to pay only if the subcontractor established,
without reference to the bond, a legal and valid claim for
compensation. ( Civ. Code, § 2810.)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Alameda County and from an order denying a new trial. Chris
B. Fox, Judge. Judgment affirmed; appeal from order dismissed.
Action for damages for breach of equipment rental agreements, for reasonable value of equipment alleged to have been
held beyond agreed rental term, and on labor and material
bonds and on stop notice bonds. Judgment for defendants
affirmed.
Howard B. Crittenden, Jr., for Appellants.
Thelen, Marrin, Johnson & Bridges, Gordon Johnson and
Dario De Benedictis for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiffs George W. Lewis and Paul C.
Queen are engaged in the contracting business as the partnership of Lewis and Queen, hereinafter referrrd to as plaintiff.
Defendant Ball Sons, hereinafter referred to as defendant,
is also in the contracting businesR.
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In June, 1949, defendant was awarded two contracts by
the state, each contract for the construction of a separate
section of the Hollywood Parkway. Defendant then entered
into four contracts with plaintiff. With respect to the work
to be done on each section of the parkway, there were two
contracts between plaintiff and defendant. The first was
entitled a "subcontract," and under it plaintiff agreed to
remove concrete encountered during excavation of the roadway and apply water needed in the process of compacting the
ground. The second was entitled an" equipment rental agreement," and under it plaintiff agreed to provide defendant
with construction equipment for road excavation, ''overhaul,''
and compacting.
Plaintiff brought this action for damages for breach of the
equipment rental agreements and for the reasonable rental
value of equipment alleged to have been held beyond the
agreed rental term. Plaintiff also sought to recover against
sureties on labor and material bonds posted by defendant in
compliance with Government Code, section 4200, before commencing work on the parkway, and stop notice bonds posted
by defendant pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section
1184e (now § 1192.1) after the present dispute arose. Defendant answered denying that it had breached the rental
agreements, and filed a cross-complaint in which it alleged a
breach of the agreements by plaintiff and sought to recover
overpayments made to plaintiff.
The trial court found that before the execution of the rental
agreements plaintiff and defendant had entered into an
oral agreement that plaintiff would undertake as a single
subcontract the removal of concrete, application of water,
excavation, overhaul, and compacting of original ground. Defendant then discovered that if it subcontracted all of this
work, it would violate provisions in its contracts with the
state that required it to perform with its own organization
work of a value of not less than fifty per cent of the value
of all the work embraced in the state contracts. The parties
agreed therefore, with the intention of circumventing the
provisions in the state contracts, to divide the five items of
work under each state contract between two writings, a subcontract and an equipment rental agreement. Notwithstanding
the form of these writings, it remained the agreement of the
parties that plaintiff would perform all five items of work
as an integrated subcontract operation.
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There was substantial evidence to support these findings.
The rental agreements themselves provided for compensation
based on the number of cubic yards of earth moved or square
yards compacted rather than on the period of time during
which defendant had use of the equipment, and the rental term
was the time required to do the work called for by the state
contracts. Testimony indieated that plaintiff furnished and
retained control over both operating and supervisory employees, that it moved equipment to and from other jobs
without defendant's consent, and that it carried on the work
under both subcontracts and rental agreements with the same
personnel, equipment, and accounting. Defendant paid wages,
payroll taxes, and compensation insurance for employees
operating the machines, but these costs were charged against
amounts owing plaintiff under the rental agreements and so
ultimately were borne by it. Monthly progress reports from
defendant to plaintiff were on a single form and made no
segregation between charges attributable to work under the
rental agreements and charges attributable to work under
the subcontracts. The evidence, especially the testimony of
Stanley Ball, tended to show that for all practical purposes
the work was conducted by plaintiff, and that defendant exercised only such control as was necessary to coordinate the
various subcontractors working on the parkway.
The trial court concluded that plaintiff had agreed to act
and had in fact aeted as a contractor within the meaning of
section 7026 of the Business and Professions Code, and that
because it had done so without the license required by section
7028, it was barred by section 7031 from maintaining any
action for compensation. Lewis had an individual license,
but neither Queen nor the partnership of Lewis and Queen
had licenses. The court held, in the alternative, that the
rental agreements were unenforceable because they violated
the provisions in the state contracts against subcontracting
more than a certain amount of the total work. Since we
have concluded that plaintiff's failure to obtain a license prevented it from maintaining any action for compensation, we
have no cause to consider this alternative ground. The court
entered judgment for defendant on the complaint and for
plaintiff on the cross-complaint. Plaintiff appeals from the
judgment against it.*
*It also purports to appeal from an order denying a new trial. Such
an order is not appealable, but may be reviewed on an appeal from a
judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 956.)
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Section 7028 of the Business and Professions Code makes
it unlawful for "any person to engage in the business or act
in the capacity of a contractor within this State without
having a license therefor . . . . '' Section 7026 defines a contractor as ''any person, who ... does himself or by or through
others, construct, alter, repair, add to, subtract from, improve,
move, wreck or demolish any building, highway, road ... or
improvement. . . . '' ''The term contractor includes subcontractor. . . . '' Section 7030 makes it a misdemeanor for
any person to act in the capacity of a contractor without a
license. Section 7031 provides that, "No person engaged in
the business or aeting in the capacity of a contractor, may
bring or maintain any action in any court of this State for
the collodion of compensation for the performance of any
ad or contract for which a license is required by this chapter
without alleging and proving that he was a duly licensed contractor at all times during the performance of such act or
c.ontraet.''
Pnrthermore, section 7025 states that the "person" required to have a license by section 7028 includes a partnership,
and sedion 7029 makes it unlawful for two individuals, "each
of whom has been issued a license to engage separately in
the business . . . of a contractor . . . to jointly . . . act in
the capacity of a contractor ... without first having secured
an additional license for acting in the capacity of such a
joint venture or combination . . . . "
[1] The evidence shows that in spite of the form of the
rental agreements plaintiff actually undertook to and did in
fact "construct a highway" for defendant, and thereby acted
as a contractor within the meaning of section 7026. (See
Albaugh v. Moss Constr. Co., 125 Cal.App.2d 126, 132-133
[269 P.2d 936] ; Phillips v. Mcintosh, 51 Cal.App.2d 340, 343
[124 P.2d 835] ; cf. Harrison v. Shamalian, 110 Cal.App.2d
500 [243 P.2d 82] ; Andrew v. Conner, 101 Cal.App.2d 621
[225 P.2d 943] .)
Plaintiff contends, however, that because defendant admitted in its answer that equipment had been furnished under
the written rental agreements, the trial court was precluded
from finding that the actual agreements were subcontracts
because it should have restricted its findings to the issues
made by the pleadings. There is no merit in this contention.
[2] Whatever the state of the pleadings, when the evidence
shows that the plaintiff in substance seeks to enforce an illegal
contract or recover compensation for an illegal act, the court
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has both the power and duty to ascertain the true facts in
order that it may not unwittingly lend its assistance to the
consummation or eneouragement of what public policy forbids.
(Wells v. Comstock, 46 Cal.2d 528, 532 [297 P.2d 961];
Franklin v. Nat C. Goldstone Agency, 33 Cal.2d 628, 629
[204 P.2d 37] ; Fewel & Dawes, Inc. v. Pratt, 17 Cal.2d 85,
92 [109 P.2d 650] ; Endicott v. Rosenthal, 216 Cal. 721, 728
[16 P.2d 673] ; Tevis v. Blanchard, 122 Cal.App.2d 731, 732734 [266 P.2d 85] ; see Owens v. Haslett, 98 Cal.App.2d 829,
835-836 [221 P.2d 252] .) [3] It is immaterial that the
parties, whether by inadvertence or consent, even at the trial
do not raise the issue. The court may do so of its own
motion when the testimony produees evidenee of illegality.
(Norwood v. Judcl, 93 Cal.App.2d 276, 277-278, 282 [209
P.2d 24] .) It is not too late to raise the issue on motion for
new trial (Pacific Wharf & Storage Co. v. Standard American
Dredging Co., 184 Cal. 21, 23-24 [192 P. 847] ), in a proceeding to enforce an arbitration award (Franklin v. Nat C. Goldstone Agency, 33 Cal.2d 628, 629 [204 P .2d 37]), or even on
appeal. (Morey v. Paladini, 187 Cal. 727, 733-734 [203 P.
760] .) In the present ease the issue was in fact raised
during the trial.
Equally without merit is plaintiff's contention that because
the rental agreements stated that they contained all provisions agreed to by the parties, the parol evidence rule preeluded the admission of other evidence showing the true
nature of the agreement betweeen the parties and that plaintiff had in fact aeted as a contractor. [4] The parol evidenee rule does not exelude evidenee showing that a contract
lawful on its face is in fact part of an illegal transaction.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1856; Endicott v. Rosenthal, 216 Cal. 721,
728 [16 P.2d 673] ; May v. Herron, 127 Cal.App.2d 707, 710711 [274 P.2d 484] ; Kennerson v. Salih Brothers, 123 Cal.
App.2d 371, 374 [266 P.2d 871]; De Armas v. Dickerman, 108
Cal.App.2d 548, 551-552 [239 P.2d 65] .) [5] The policy
in favor of narrowing the issues in dispute, whieh normally
confines the court to those made by the pleadings, and the
policy of the parol evidence rule favoring the conclusiveness
of integrated written agreements, both give way before the
importance of discouraging illegal conduet. To this end, the
trial eourt must be free to search out illegality lying behind
the forms in which the parties have east the transaction to
conceal such illegality.
[6] Plaintiff contends that even if it acted as a con-
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tractor under section 7026, it substantially complied with the
requirement of section 7028, since Lewis held an individual
license. The "person" that did the contracting work, and
was required by section 7028 to have a license, however, was
the partnership of Lewis and Queen, and it had no license.
Nor did Queen individually. [7] Section 7029, furthermore,
expressly requires individual licensees who engage jointly in
the contracting business to obtain an additional, joint license.
(Of. Joseph v. Drew, 36 Cal.2d 575, 578 [225 P.2d 504];
Wise v. Radis, 74 Cal.App. 765,773 [242 P. 90].)
Undoubtedly there are situations in which substantial compliance with the licensing requirements satisfies the policy of
the statute. (See Gatti v. Highland Park Builders, Inc., 27
Cal.2d 687, 689-691 [166 P.2d 265]; Citizens State Bank of
Long Beach v. Gentry, 20 Cal.App.2d 415, 419-420 [67 P.2d
364]; ef. Oddo v. Iledde, 101 Cal.App.2d 375 [225 P.2d 929] .)
The facts of the present case, however, with one partner
licensed individually and no partnership license, are precisely
those in Loving & Evans v. Blick, 33 Cal.2d 603 [204 P.2d
23], and in that case we said, "There can be no question but
that this case presents a clear violation of the statutes regulating the contracting business." (33 Cal.2d at 607; see also
Kirman v. Borzage, 65 Cal.App.2d 156, 158-159 [150 P.2d
3]; Holm v. Bramwell, 20 Cal.App.2d 332, 335-336
P.2d
114].) We distinguished Gatti v. Highland Park Builders,
Inc., supra, on the ground that there both partners held individual licenses and during the performance of the contract
a joint license was issued to them and a third person, and
Citizens State Bank of Long Beach v. Gentry, s~tpra, on the
ground that in that case, although the plaintiff's license expired while the work was in progress, it was renewed in the
name of a corporation controlled by him.
In both the Gatti and Gentry cases, any matter that might
have formed the subject of inquiry by the licensing board in
determining whether to issue an additional license was necessarily considered in connection with the licenses actually
issued. In the present case, however, the board has never
determined the qualifications of Queen. [8] Plaintiff claims
that this makes no difference, because it was I.Jewis who supervised the actual construction work and Queen merely kept
the books and sought out new business for the partnership.
But the statutory provisions setting forth the qualifications
for a license, and the causes for disciplinary action against
licensees, show that the Legislature was as much concerned
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to protect the public from dishonesty and ineompetence in
the administration of the contracting business as in the actual
use of bricks, mortar, and earth-moving equipment. (E.g.,
§§ 7068, 7069, 7120.) Plaintiff's insistence that Queen knew
nothing about actual construction simply emphasizes the importance of the board's passing on his qualifications to <'ngage
in any aspect of the contracting business. The statute makes
it elear, furthermore, that if the contractor is a partnership,
the experience, knowledge, and integrity of each partner is a
vital consideration in determining whether to issue a license.
(E.g., §§ 7067, 7069, 7071.) Finally, it is not clear that
Queen's activities were in fact confined to bookkeeping and
the search for new business. He participated with lJewis in
the negotiations that led to the execution of the contracts,
and he "walked the job," apparently to determine what problems would be eneountered if the work was undertaken. The
conclusion is inescapable that plaintiff did not substantially
comply with the lieensing requirements.
[9] Since plaintiff did not comply with the statute, it
cannot "bring or maintain any action in any court of this
State for the collection of compensation. . . . '' ( § 7031 ;
Loving & Evans v. Blick, 33 Oal.2d 603 [204 P.2d 23].)
[10] Plaintiff contends, nevertheless, that because defendant
has been paid in full by the state for all work rlone on the parkway, justice requires that it be compelled to turn over to
plaintiff the proceeds from the state eontraets attributable to
plaintiff's labor.
One answer to this contention is that, ev<m in the absence of a provision such as section 7031, the <'Onrts generally will not enforce an illegal bargain or lend their assistance to a party who seeks eompensation for an illegal aet.
The reason for this refusal is not that the courts are unaware
of possible injustice between the parties, and that the defendant may be left in possession of some benefit he should in
good conscience turn over to the plaintiff, but that this consideration is outweighed by the importance of deterring
illegal conduct. Knowing that they will receive no help from
the courts and must trust completely to each other's good
faith, the parties are less likely to enter an illegal arrangement in the first place. (See Takeuchi v. 8chrnuck, 206 Cal.
782, 786-787 [276 P. 345]; JJiay v. Herron, 127 Oal.App.2d
707, 712 [274 P.2d 484] ; Orlinoff v. Campbell, 91 Oal.App.2d
382, 388 [205 P.2d 67] ; Wise v. Radis, 74 Oal.App. 765, 778
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[242 P. 90] ; Grodecki, In Pari Delicto Potior Est Conditio
Defendentis, 71 hQ.Hev. 254, 266-268.)
In some cases, on the other hand, the statute making
the conduct illegal, in providing for a fine or administrative
discipline excludes by implication the additional penalty involved in holding the illegal contract unenforceable; or effective deterrence is best realized by enforcing the plaintiff's
claim rather than leaving the defendant in possession of the
benefit; or the forfeiture resulting from unenforceability is
disproportionately harsh considering the nature of the illegality. In each such case, how the aims of policy can best
be achieved depends on the kind of illegality and the particular facts involved. (See Wilson v. Stearns, 123 Cal.App.2d
472, 481-482 [267 P.2d 59]; John E. Rosasco Creameries, Inc.
v. Cohen, 276 N.Y. 274, 278-280 [11 N.E.2d 908, 118 A.L.R.
641] ; 6 Corbin, Contracts 964-967 ( 1951) ; 2 Pomeroy, Equity
Jurisprudence 137 (5th ed. 1941); Grodecki, In Pari Delicto
Potior Est Cond,itio Defenclentis, 71 L.Q.Rev. 254, 268.) But
we are not free to weigh these considerations in the present
case. [11] Section 7031 represents a legislative determination that the importance of deterring unlicensed persons from
engaging in the contracting business outweighs any harshness
between the parties, and that such deterrence can best be realized by denying violators the right to maintain any action for
compensation in the courts of the state (Kirman v. Borzage,
65 Cal.App.2d 156, 158 [150 P.2d 3] .) :Moreover, even if we
could take into account unjust enrichment of defendant, it
is not at all clear that, had it reached the issue, the trial
court would have found defendant indebted to plaintiff beyond what it had already paid.
Norwood v. Jtldd, 93 Cal.App.2d 276 [209 P.2d 24], Galich
v. Brkich, 103 Cal.App.2d 187 [229 P.2d 89], and Wold v.
Lnigi Consentino &; Sons, 109 Cal.App.2d 854 [241 P.2d
1032], do not support plaintiff's right to recover. Each of
those cases involved an action by a partner or joint venturer
to recover a share of profits arising from an illegal enterprise. It was held that, since the enterprise was terminated,
since it was not illegal as such but only for want of a
license, and since the action was not against a third person
for whose protection the statute had been primarily enacted
but against a partner or joint venturer, the purpose of the
law would not be served by denying relief. We need not
decide at this time whether an action for an accounting against
a partner or joint venturer is "an action for the collection of
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<'ompensati(m" within section 7031 (cf. Wise v. Radis, 74 Cal.
App. 765, 775 l242 P. 90]) or, even if it is not, whether
the i11direct encouragement of an illegal enterpriHe resulting
from tbe allowanee of such an action is sufficient to outweigh
the evil of unjust enriehment. (See Hooper v. Barrant,i, 81
Cal.App.2d 570, 575-578 [184 P.2d 688] ; 32 A.L.R2d 1345,
1387; \Yade, Restitution of Benefits Acquired Through Illegal
'l'mnsactions, 95 U.Pa.L.Rev. 261, 294-296; but see Denning v.
'l'aber, 70 Cal.App.2d 253, 257-260 [160 P.2d 900].)
[12] The present action is against a third party, and is to
enforce directly an illegal contract, not merely to obtain an
accounting for profits arising from one. As Nm·wood v. Judd
itself recognizes, this situation falls squarely within section
7031. (93 Cal.App.2d 276, 283.)
Plaintiff next contends that, by virtue of the fact that it is
a subcontractor suing a general contractor rather than a
general contractor suing an owner, neither section 7031 nor
the general rule that illegal contracts are unenforceable bars
its action. JJiatchctt v. Gould, 131 Cal.App.2d 821 [281 P.2d
524], appears to make this distinction decisive. In that case
the Crane Service Company and the defendants, all unlicensed
contractors, decided to undertake the demolition of buildings
for a school district. The understanding between Crane and
the defendants was that Crane would make the bid and
defendants supply the funds to pay the school district; that
the defendants would then do the actual work of taking
down the bricks, using for this purpose Crane's machines, for
which a reasonable rental would be paid; the defendants
would pay Crane for removing concrete and rough-grading
the site, and all salvageable material would belong to the defendants. After the job was completed and the defendants had
received all the revenues from the sale of salvage, they refused
to pay Crane. Crane's assignee sued to enforce the contract.
'fhe District Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff could
recover in spite of section 7031. The first ground of its
decision appears to be that, unless the plaintiff was allowed
to recover the defendants would be unjustly enriched.
[13] As we have already pointed out, the courts may not
resort to equitable considerations in defiance of section 7031.
As an alternative ground, the court reasoned that Crane had
in effect assigned the school district contract to defendants
and then become their subcontractor; that subcontractors are
in a class for whose protection the licensing statute was enacted (relying on our statement in F'raenkel v. Bank of
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America, 40 Cal.2d 845, 848 [256 P.2d 569], that the statute
vvas designed ''for the prevention of fraudulent acts by contractors resulting in loss to subcontractors, materialmen, employees, and owners of structures'') ; and that therefore a subcontractor can maintain an action on a contract with a general
contractor, even though it is an illegal contract, because
the subcontractor is not considered in pari delicto. (131 Cal.
App.2d at 829.)
[14] It is true that when the Legislature enacts a statute
forbidding certain conduct for the purpose of protecting one
class of persons from the activities of another, a member of
the protected class may maintain an action notwithstanding
the fact that he has shared in the illegal transaction. The
protective purpose of the legislation is realized by allowing
the plaintiff to maintain his action against a defendant within
the class primarily to be deterred. In this situation it is said
that the plaintiff is not in pari delicto. ( Cader v. Seaboard
P'inance Co., 33 Cal.2d 564, 574 [203 P.2d 758]; McAllister v.
Drapeau, 14 Cal.2d 102, 112 [92 P.2d 911, 125 A.hR. 800] ;
Pollak v. Staunton, 210 Cal. 656, 662-663 [293 P. 26] ; Elmers
v. Shapiro, 91 Cal.App.2d 741, 754 [205 P.2d 1052]; see
Grodecki, In Pari Delicto Potior Est Conditio Defendentis,
71 L.Q.Rev. 254, 265; Wade, Restitution of Benefits Acquired
Through Illegal Transactions, 95 U.Pa.L.Rev. 261, 268-270.)
[15] But subcontractors are not always in the class to be
protected simply because they are subcontractors, and we did
not suggest otherwise in Fraenkel v. Bank of America, 40 Cal.
2d 845, 848 [256 P.2d 569]. (See Albaugh v. Moss Constr.
Co., 125 Cal.App.2d 126, 132 [269 P.2d 936]; Ilolrn v. Bramwell, 20 Cal.App.2d 332 [67 P.2d 114] .) The class protected
by the statute includes those who deal with a person required
by the statute to have a license. [16] When the person required to have a license is a general contractor, then the
protected class includes subcontractors, materialmen, employees, and owners dealing with the general contractor.
[17] However, when the person who was required to have a
license but did not have one is himself a subcontractor, such
as plaintiff in the present case, he of course is not to be
protected from his own unlicensed activities. To allow him
to recover would in fact destroy the protection of those who
dealt with him, and they are in the class the Legislature
intended to protect whether they are owners or general eontractors. (Cf. Hedlttnd v. Sutter Medical Service Co., 51 Cal.
App.2d 327, 333 [124 P.2d 878]; 2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurispru-
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denee 142 (5th ed. 1941).) To the extent that it is contrary,
the reasoning of Matchett v. Gould, 131 Cal.App.2d 821 [281
P.2d 524], is erroneous and is disapproved. Under the facts
of the present ease plaintiff is not in the elass to be protected,
and therefore is not relieved from the imputation of being in
pari delicto. Its failure to obtain a license, and not any fault
of defendant in this regard, made the transaction illegal.
[18] There is no merit in plaintiff's further contention
that it may maintain this action simply because it is an action
against a licensed member of plaintiff's own profession, rather
than against the owner for whose ultimate benefit the work
was done. General contractors as much as owners are entitled
to raise the defense of lack of a license in the subcontraetor.
If they were not, section 7031 vmuld be no deterrent to subcontraetors, since they generally do look to the general eontractor for compensation. Yet section 7026, stating that "the
term eontrador includes subcontractor,'' clearly imposes on
unlicensed subcontractors the same disabilities as on unlicensed
general eontractors. Cases from other jurisdictions cited by
plaintiff (e.g., Dow v. United States, for Use and Benefit of
Holley, 154lj1.2d 707,710 [lOth Cir.] ), do not involve statutory
prohibitions like section 7031.
[19a] Plaintiff's final contention is that, even if it cannot
reeover on the rental agreements from defendant, the defense
of lack of a license is not available to the sureties on the
bonds. Section 7031 provides, however, that no person who
acts as a contractor "may bring or maintain any action ... for
the collection of compensation for the performance of any
aet ... '' for which a license is required, without alleging and
proving that he was licensed. (Italics added.) [20] We have
already held that an action to enforce an arbitration award
is an action within the meaning of this provision (Loving d';
Evans v. Blick, 33 Cal.2d 603, 613 [204 P.2d 23] ; Franklin v.
Nat C. Goldstone Agency, 33 Cal.2d 628, 631-633 [204 P.2d
37]), and it is clear that an action to foreclose a mechanic's
lien is also. (Albmtgh v. 111oss Constr. Co., 125 Cal.App.2d
126, 132 [269 P.2d 936] ; Cash v. Blackett, 87 Cal.App.2d 233,
237 [196 P.2d 585] ; Siemens v. Meconi, 44 Cal.App.2d 641
[112 P.2d 904]; Holm v. Bramwell, 20 Cal.App.2d 332, 334
[67 P.2d 114] .) [19b] In view of the purpose of section
7031, we can see no reason to distinguish an action on a bond.
In all of these cases the object of the plaintiff is to obtain, morr
or less directly, compensation for unlicrnsed work. The deterrent purpose behind section 7031 would be frustrated if the
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plaintiff, prevented from obtaining compensation directly by
an action on his contract, could obtain it indirectly by an
adion on a bond.
[21] Moreover, even in the absence of section 7031, the
defense of illegality is available to the surety if it is available to his principal. (Wells v. Comstock, 46 Cal.2d 528, 533
[297 P.2d 961]; Rest., Security, § 117, comment d.) Lewis
& Queen v. S. Edmondson & Sons, 113 Cal.App.2d 705, 707708 [248 P.2d 973], and Pneucrete Corp. v. United States Fid.
& Guar. Co., 7 Cal.App.2d 733, 736-740 [46 P.2d 1000], which
are cited by plaintiff, in spite of broad language in the opinions do not hold otherwise. The obligation of the sureties on
defendant's bonds was not to pay for labor merely by virLte
of the fact that it had been expended on the parkway. It
was au obligation to pay only if plaintiff established, without
reference to the bond, a legal and valid claim for compensation. (See Civ. Code, § 2810; Flickinger v. Swedlow Engineering Co., 45 Cal.2d 388, 393-394 [289 P.2d 214] ; Rest.,
Seeurity § 117, comment c.) This plaintiff has not done.
Appeal from order denying motion for new trial dismissed.
,Jndgment affirmed.
Shenk, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
In my opinion, the strict construction placed upon Business
awl Professions Code sections, particularly section 7031. by
the majority is unwarranted. Section 7031 is but a statutory
dedaration of the common law rule that a contract which
Yiolates a statute designated for the protection of the public
is Yoid and unenforceable. (Levinson v. Boas, 150 Cal. 185
[88 P. 825, 11 Ann.Cas. 661, 12 L.R.A.N.S. 575] ; Berka v.
Woodward, 125 Cal. 119 [57 P. 777, 73 Am.St.Rep. 31, 45
L.RA. 420] ; 12 Am.Jur., Contracts, § 158, p. 652.) This
rule, however, is not applied where to do so does not serve
the intended purpose of the statute. (Wilson v. Stearns, 123
Cal.App.2d 472, 478 [267 P.2d 59], citing Harris v. Rtlnnels,
12 How. (U.S.) 79 [13 L.Ed. 901]; 12 Am.Jur., Contracts,
§ 162, p. 657.) At one time in this state, statutes, such as
section 7031, which expressly deny the enforcement of contraets which violate a particular law, were strictly construed
to prevent recovery. (See e.g., Wise v. Radis, 74 Cal.App.
765 [242 P. 90], involving a statute which prevented the enforcement of certain contracts by unlicensed real estate
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brokers.) More recently, however, section 7031, although literally ap plieable, has not been applied where enforcement of
the contract ~was eonsidered not to be adverse to the publie
interest sought to be protected by the pertinent Business
and Professions Code sections. (Gatti v. Highland Park
Builders, Inc., 27 Cal.2d 687 [166 P.2d 265] ; Citizens State
Bank v. Gentry, 20 CaLApp.2d 415 [67 P.2d 364]; Norwood v.
Judd, 93 Cal.App.2d 276 [209 P.2d 24]; Galich v. Brkich, 103
Cal.App.2d 187 [229 P.2d 89]; Wold v. Luigi Consentino &
Sons, 109 Cal.App.2d 854 [241 P.2d 1032] ; Matchett v. Gould,
131 Cal.App.2d 821 [281 P.2d 524] .) The effect of these eases
is that the common law exceptions to the rule are recognized
as being preferable to a strict, literal construction of the
statutory language. Accordingly, the conclusion of the majority-that because plaintiff is within the statutory definition
(subcontractor) and seeks recovery of his share of the proceeds arising from the work, it necessarily follows that recovery must be denied-is based upon an incomplete analysis of
the question presented. Rather, an examination should be
made to determine whether the intended statutory purpose
requires the denial of enforcement of this particular contract.
Such an examination, it is submitted, demonstrates that the
statute was not so intended.
The facts of this case are quite similar to those in Norwood
v. Judd, supra. There, plaintiff and defendant had formed a
partnership to conduct a contracting business. Defendant was
a duly licensed contractor but neither plaintiff nor the partnership was. Plaintiff brought an action to recover his share
of the business proceeds from his partner. Literally, Business
and Professions Code, section 7031, would have barred plaintiff's action as it provides, in part, that: "No person engaged
in the business or acting in the capacity of a contractor,
may bring or maintain any action . . . for the collection of
compensation for the performance of any act or contract for
which a license is required by this chapter without alleging
and proving that he was a duly licensed contractor at all
times during the performance of such act or contract.'' However, recovery was allowed and the court declared (93 Cal.
App.2d at 286) that "It must be remembered that these
licensing statutes are passed primarily for the protection and
safety of the public. They are not passed for the benefit
of a greedy partner who seeks to keep for himself all of
the fruits of the partnership enterprise to the exclusion of
another partner entitled to share therein. Where the illegal
transaction has been terminated, public policy is not pro-
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or served by denying one partner relief against the
other." It was further noted (p. 288) that Wise v. Radis,
supra, (applying the strict rule of construction) had been
overruled in legal effect. Defendant's petition for a hearing
in the l\or wood case was denied by this court.
A similar problem was presented in Galich v. B1·kich, supra,
103 Cal.App.2d 187. Plaintiff, apparently an unlicensed contractor, entered into a joint venture or partnership agreement
Yrith defendant. No license was obtained for the enterprise
as required by Business and Professions Code, section 7029.
In allowing recovery by plaintiff of the money due him for
the contracting work performed by the venture, the court
declared (p. 191) that "The contract in question was not per
sc contrary to any statute; public welfare and safety were
not threatened, and public policy would not be protected or
served by denying one partner relief against the other."
Applying the reasoning of the Norwood case, supra, the court
observed that '' . . . the rule that courts will not lend their
aid to the enforcement of an illegal agreement should not be
'blindly' extended to 'every case where illegality appears
somewhere in the transaction.'" Defendant's petition for a
hearing in this court was denied.
In Wold v. Luigi Consentino & Sons, supra, 109 Cal.App.
2d 854, the same problem was again presented. The application of the statute was rejected, the court declaring (p. 857)
that its main purpose was protection of owners.
Recovery was allowed in these cases because the actions
were not against those whom the statute was intended to
protect, that is, an owner or other member of the general
public who is without knowledge of or experience in contracting affairs, and hence, is wholly dependent upon the competence of the contractor. Accordingly, the statute was not
applied to allow an associate of an unlicensed individual to
retain the proceeds rightfully owing to the latter. It seems
clear that this principle is applicable here, despite the absence
of a partnership or joint venture relationship, for in practical
the circumstances are identical. Two parties agreed
to perform work for a third party and one of the two has
11·ithheld the other's share of the proceeds. Upon facts identir:al 1o those in the present ease, the Second District Court
of Appeal in M atchctt v. Goulrl, supra, 131 Cal.App.2d 821,
applied tlw prineiple of the partnership cases and allowed
rr:(,overy. In that case, neither plaintiff, a subcontractor, nor
<lefendant, a general contractor, was licensed. Upon com-
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plntion of a contracting job for a third party, plaintiff sought
the amount owing to him for the work performed. Analogizing
to Norwood v . .J 1lCld, supra, the court allowed reeovery and
deelared that the precise relationship between the parties,
that is, whether partners or eontraetor and snbeontraetor, was
not determinative and that the statute waR not intended to
prevent recovery where the nuliccnscd contractor has eomplcted the job, where there is no serious moral turpitude involved and where a denial of reeovery would permit unjust
enriehment of one not intended to be protected, namely, the
general contraetor. Citing Gatti v. Highland Park Builders,
Inc., supra, 27 Cal.2d 687, the court observed (131 Cal.App.2d
at 829) that the statute was not intended as an "unwarranted
:shield for the avoidance of a just obligation."
Hero, the majority, to sustain their decision that plaintiff
is precluded from enforeing his contract, concludes that the
reasoning of Matchett v. Gat[ld, S?tpm, is erroneous, although
a petition for hearing in that case was denied by this court.
'rhe majority opinion further deelares that "To allow him
[plaintiff] to recover would in fact destroy the protection of
those who dealt with him, and they are in the class the Legislature intended to protect whether they are owners or general
contractors." What proteetion is to be afforded a general eontractor? He is not in the position of a member of the public
who desires contracting work performed and because of the
disparity of knowledge and experience is extended statutory
protection. Rather, his position is equal to that of the subcontractor and he is, therefore, able to judge the nature and
quality of the subcontractor's performance for himself. If
the statute was intended to "protect" a general contractor
as a member of the public, as undeniably he is, then it should
be applied to ''protect,'' from one another, members of a
partnership which has illegally undertaken contracting work.
It has been seen, however, that the statute is not construed in
such a fashion. In the interests of just and consistent application, it should not be so construed here. For this reason,
I would reverse the judgment and remand the case for a
determination of the cause on its merits.
Schauer, J., concurred.
Appella11ts' petition for a rehearing was denied "''\pril 17,
1957. CHrter, .T., a11d Sdwner, .T., were of the opinion that
the petition should be gnmtecl. Gibson, C.•J., did not participate therein.

